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ABSTRACT
Hazard assessment techniques, namely, fault tree analysis and safety analysis, have been applied
to the nitration section of a plant producing explosives in the defence sector. Critical components
and operations, the failure of which could lead to the occurrence of an unwanted event, have been
identified and their effects quantitatively assessed. Some remedial measures have been suggested to
mini mise potential hazards and the effect of incorporating these measures on the system safety has
been examined by me~ns of specific case studies.
critical event itself is a result of the systematic analysis
using FETI (fire, explosion and toxicity index) and
HAZOP (hazard and operatibility) studies techniques,
A fault tree is a graphical representation of the logical
relations between an undesired event (fire, explosion,
etc.), called the 'top event' and the primary cause
events5. A qualitative analysis systematically maps all
possible combinations of causes for a defined top event.
The quantitative analysis may also be performed if data
on the frequencies or failure rates of the various basic
causes are available and thr; risk of occurrence of the
top event is to be evaluated.
2. CASE STUDY: NITRATION SECnON OF A
CHEMICAL PLANT
A small chemical plant, designed to produce less
than 40 kg of a specific high explosive per day per shift,
has been taken up for study. This plant comprises
mixing, nitration, simmering, dissolution and
re-crystallization sections.
The HAZOP study has identified all possible
deviations from the defined int,- ntion in each section of
the plant and also listed out various probable causes
and consequences of each such deviation. This study
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid growth of large and complex units processing
explosives or flammable or otherwise hazardous
chemicals under. extreme temperature and pressure
conditions. poses a threat to human life, property and
the environment. Swift technological developments in
untested areas with no opportunity for gradual evolution
and learning by trial and error, as well as ever increasing
sophistication in design, tend to make projects
vulnerable to failurel. The failure of such hi-tech
projects often leads to catastrophic conditions, and this
makes it imperative to get the design and operating
procedures right the first time.
The need for systematic analysis of the potential
hazards and likely risks from the process plants
producing sensitiv~ explosives in the defence sector ,
thus becomes very critical. Therefore, the quantitative
hazard assessment techniques2.3 must be used for every
sub-system of the plant being designed, to minimise the
catastrophic accidents resulting from a combination of
primary .secondary or command failures.
This paper describes the quantitative and qualita~ive
assessment of a critical event, using a hazard assessment
technique. fault tree analysis4. Identification of the
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has identified the nitration section as one of the most
hazardous sections of this plant.
instrumentation/safety features are incorporated in this
assembly:
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Figure I. P&I diagram for nitrator section.
(a)
(b)
(c)
The entry of the reactants to the nitrators is
metered by means of rotameters.
High-Ievel alarms are provided in the control
panel for all the N and A vessels.
Temperature of the reaction mixture inside the
N and A vessels is maintained at the design
temperature by an ON/OFF temperature
indicator controller (nC).The sensing element
is a thermocouple. The final control element is
a solenoid valve in the inlet line of chilled water
to the jackets.
The nitration section consists of four vessels: two
nitrators and two ageing vessels. Nitration takes place
in two stages. In the first stage, nitration of solution I
is carried out by its reaction with solution 2 in the
presence of acetic anhydride and p-formaldehyde. This
reaction starts in the first nitrator (NI) (Fig. I) and
proceeds to completion in the first ageing vessel (AI).
The second stage involves reaction with more of solution
2 in the second nitrator (N2). This reaction is completed
in the second ageing vessel (A2).
Being exothermic, the reactions occurring in stages
I and II lead to an increase in the temperature of the
reaction mixture. If this rise is not controlled, it could
lead to a runaway reaction. Therefore, jacketed vessels
with chilled water circulation are used for the nitrator
(N) and ageing (A) vessels. The following
(d) When the temperature reaches the first set
point, the flow of chilled water supply to the
jacket starts to prevent further rise in
temperature. In case the chilled water supply
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(c) Command failure is also a sub-system failure
which occurs when a component is functional
but fails because of incorrect control signals,
energy supply, etc. , such as when chilled water
supply fails (67) or temperature control fails
(60). Secondary and command failures are
further developed to basic failures.
Following one of the branches of the fault tree, the
runaway reaction (52) could occur as a result of any
one of the following three possible causes:
(a) Reactants not added in correct proportion (55),
(b) Improper reaction conditions (56), and
(c) Agitator not functioning (57).
The relation among these three causes, therefore,
is represented by an OR gate. Considering only the
second cause, it could occur due to either rise in
temperature or increased residence time within the
nitrator. The rise in temperature itself could be due to
failure of the solenoid valve (66), chilled water supply
failure (67) or failure of the temperature control system
(68). The temperature control could fail as a result of
either thermocouple failure or controller failure.
Each branch of the tree, in turn, is likewise broken
down into primary or basic failures. The analysis of this
tree involves the identification of minimal cut-sets,
following common mode failure resolution procedure
(Table 1). Common cause failure is an important point
which has significant bearing on the top event
probability. These are basic failures which recur in
various branches of the fault tree meeting at an AND
gate. These failures occur when the components have
some common susceptibility or a common location; two
such examples are power failure and water supply
failure. Wherever common cause failures are identified,
they are to be eliminated as they greatly reduce the
reliability of the system. By this procedure, each event
is repla('",-d by the inputs to its gates; AND gate-inputs
being placed horizontally and OR gate-inputs inserted
vertically in the table.
Since the identification of cut-sets and calculation
of their probabilities in case of large trees is a laborious
task, use of computers is helpful in obtaining the
top-event probability. A computer program, developed
at this Centre, has been used to obtain the minimal
cut-sets and the corresponding failure rates.
to the jacket fails and the temperature reaches
the second (higher) set point which is set at
15 °C higher than the first set point, two
additional safety features come into play.
The first safety feature is the provision of flush water
to N and A vessels from an overhead tank. Inlet of the
flush water to the N and A vessels is also controlled by
the same 11C through another solenoid valve fitted in
the inlet line of flush water. Water is used to flush the
contents of the N and A vessels in case of a runaway
reaction.
The second safety feature provides for the drainage
of the contents of nitrator in case of a runaway reaction.
An air operated diaphragm valve (AODV) fitted at the
drain takes care of this contingency; the AODV gets
activated by the 11C as soon as the second set point is
reached and releases the contents of the nitrator into a
drain.
3. FAULT TREE: NITRATION SECTION
The fault tree for 'critical conditions in the nitrator'
leading to fire/explosion has been constructed (Fig. 2)
Construction of fault tree is a deductive process and
involves working backwards from effects towards
causes6. The main elements of the tree are event
definitions, such as RUNAWAY REAC11ON or NO
FLUSH W A TER and logic gates, such as AND and
OR, which indicate the inter-relationship between
various failure events. This tree has been analysed to
find the minimal cut-sets, followed by the actual
calculation of the top event probability.
As seen from Fig. 2, the top event could occur only
if runaway reaction occurred in the nitralor with
simultaneous failure of two safety features, viz. , flush
water to nitrator and drainage from nitrator. This is
shown by an AND gate linking the top event to the
three sub-events. Each of these contributory causes is
then further broken down into more basic causes. The
causes of failure may be primary, secondary or
command.
(a) Primary failure is caused by inherent weakness
in a component and is a basic failure such as
faulty rotameter (9) or line fracture (6).
(b) Secondary failure is a sub-system failure ~nd is
caused when a component has been loaded
beyond its limits such as when flow rate of
solutions is more (69) or charge solution is
faulty (65).
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Table 1. Identification or minimal cut-sets
VI VIII II III IV v
(36)2CD
(36)3CD
(36)4CD
(36)250
(36)2LO
(36)2MO
(36)2NO
(36)200
(36)2(28)0
(36)2(29)0
(36)350
(36)3LD
(36)3MD
(36)3NO
(36)300
(36)3(28)0
(36)3(29)0
(36)450
(36)4LO
(36)4MD
(36)4ND
(36)400
(36)4(28)0
(36)4(29)0
Contd-.BCD (36)ECD (36)2FD
(36)2GD
(36)2HD
(36)3FD
(36)3GD
(36)3HD
(36)4FD
(36)4GD
(36)4HD
A
t
Failure to use manual override (36)
Air-operated diaphragm valve (AODV) failure (4)
Incorrect addition of p-forrnaldehyde (5)
Raw material impure (7)
Incorrect quantity of raw material added (8)
Power supply failure (16)
Water supply failure (18)
Failure to check water in flush water tank (30)
Of these, events (36), (30), (5), (7) and (8) are
operator errors; (36) being the most critical as it occurs
in every cut-set of the fault tree. Human errors or failure
rates are comparatively higher and vary unpredictably
as compared to instrument and other component failure
rates. In addition, humans do not fare well in making
repetitiv'e programmed responses to specific stimuli7.
Irwould, therefore, be advisable, wherever possible,
to replace operator control by instrumental controls for
routine, programmable but critical actions. Wherever
it is not possible, the following actions can be tak'en to
aid the operator as well as to decrease the probability
of failure:
The data to this program is input through a file which
accepts five values in a sequence of main node
(number), type of gate connecting it to next event
(AND, OR, NOT), numberofsub-nodesin that branch,
numbers of these sub-nodes and probability of
occurrence of the main node. The output is then
consolidated through a data file.
J. be failure rates used in these calculations are based
on the data compiled by UK Atomic Energy Authority,
Atomic Energy Commission and Institute of Chemical
Engineers8.
From the results of this analysis, minimal cut-sets
along with number of yPars between each failure have
been listed in Table 2, in the decreasing order of
criticality (refer Fig. 2). The highest probability of
occurrence of critical condition in nitrator works out to
about once in 5.2 years.
On examination of the list of 360 minimal cut-sets
obtained for the fault tree for nitrator, it is evident that
there are no single or double point failures. Table 2
also brings out those basic events which are critical by
virtue of their relation to the top event and their high
failure rates. Some of them are listed below:
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Table 2. Criticality ranking of occurrence of top event
Minimalcut-sets Years/Fault
(36: 4: 16: 30: 18:)
(36:4:5:16:)
( 36: 4: 7: 16:)
(36:4:8: 16:)
(36:4:17:16:)
(36:2:16:30:18:)
(36:2:5:16:)
(36:2:7:16:)
(36:2:8:16:)
(36:2:17:16:)
(36:4:5:30:18:)
(36:4:7:30:18:)
( 36: 4: 8: 30: 18:)
( 36: 4: 17: 30: 18:)
(36:4:16:)
( 36: 4: 18: 16:)
(36:4:22: 16:)
(36:2:7:30:18:)
(36:2:8:30: 18:)
(36:2: 17:30: 18:)
(36:2:16:)
( 36: 2: 18: 16:)
(36:2:22:16:)
(36:4:9:16:)
(36:4:13:16:)
(36:2:9:16:)
contd
5.21
5.21
5.21
5.21
5.21
6.25
6.25
6.25
6.25
6.25
10.42
10.42
10.42
10.42
10.42
10.42
11.08
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
12.5
13.29
15.32
15.32
18.38
(a)
is the logical reverse of a fault tree. Resolution of this
tree gives the number of possible ways by which a top
unwanted event may be avoided.
Safety analysis basically involves the same steps as
does a fault tree analysis, with the following differences :
(a) A safety tree is generally constructed for an
event for which a fault tree already exists. The
top event of the safety tree is the avoidance of
the top event of the corresponding fault tree.
The structure of safety tree is similar to that of
the corresponding fault tree, except for the
replacement of the logic gates, AND by OR
and OR by AND, respectively.
(b) The safety tree is resolved in a similar manner
as in the case of a fault tree. The minimal
cut-sets obtained give the minimum
combination of basic events required to avoid
occurrence of the top unwanted event. From
the cut-sets obtained, the lower order cut-sets,
especially the single or one point cut-sets
deserve special attention. They pinpoint those
single, critical components and/or safety
measures whose successful working or inclusion
would ensure non-occurrence of a critical
event.
(c) Basic events recurring in one or more branches
of the safety tree deserve special consideration
as the successful working of one such
component would ensure that more than one
branch of the tree is taken care of.
Cut-sets of the safety tree for 'critical conditions in
the nitrator' are given in Table 3 in the order of
increasing number of basic events per cut-set or in the
decreasing order of importance.
(b)
Table 3. Minimal cut-sets for the safety tree fer nitrator
(c)
Positioning of the override lever in a prominent
location and marking it in fluorescent paint for
easy identification, would reduce the response
time in case of an emergency.
Quality as well as quantity of the reactants
added to the mixing tanks, and p-formaldehyde
added to the nitrator, should be double
checked.
Events (16) and (18), i.e. , power and water
supply failures result in command failures.
Therefore an alternative source of power
supply, preferably a generator, could be
considered. A water storage tank of sufficient
capacity with level indicator and low-level alarm
to meet both flush water and chilled water
requirements could be provided.
(36)
(2)(3)(4)
(30)(32)(33)(34)(35)
(31)(32)(33)(34)(35)
(5)(6) (23)(24)(26)(27)
(5)(6) (23)(25)(26)(27)
It is seen that the safety tree for the top event in
the nitrator has six cut-sets, which consist of one single
point, one triple point, two five point and two 22 point
SAFETY ANAL YSIS
A logical fallout of the fault tree analysis is the safety
lIysis. This analysis is based on a safety tree, which
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cut-sets. The 22 point cut-sets need not be considered
for safety analysis as it would be practically impossible
to ensure the non-occurrence of 22 events
simultaneously. The other cut-sets are analysed, and
the required actions to be taken to ensure the
non-occurrence of the top event are suggested as
follows :
(a) The only single point cut-set of the safety tree
is event number (36), i.e., manuai override to
drain the nitrator. Therefore, if the use of the
manual override is ascertained, it would also
ensure non-occurrence of critical event in the
nitrator .
The next cut-set, (2)(3)(4), is of order three.
The occurrence of all the three events, viz.
uninterrupted air supply, failure-free operation
of the diaphragm valve and crack/rupture-free
operation of the air line, ensures the operation
of the AOOV valve and the drainage of the
contents of the nitrator in the event of an
emergency.
The next two cut-sets are of order five and
consist of the five basic events: (i) water should
be available, (ii) solenoid valve should not fail,
(iii) power supply to the valve should not fail,
(iv) thermocouple should function accurately,
and (v) the temperature controller should not
fail.
Probability of occurrence of top event also reduces to
0.096 faults/year or 10.4 years between each fault.
Case 2: Effect of Change in Failure Rate
Use of manual override lever in case of a runaway
reaction has been identified by both fault tree and safety
analysis to be one sure way of preventing occurrence
of top (unwanted) event. If the use of this lever can be
ensured whe1:1ever required, i.e. , the failure rate for this
event is reduced from 0.4/year to say O.00l/year, the
probability of occurrence of top event reduces to once
in 208 years. Reduction in the failure rate of this event
would perhaps involve positioning of an operator with
adequate backup, solely for the purpose of operating
this lever .
(b)
(c)
6. SUMMARY
Safe design of a plant involves eliminating potcntial
hazards by modifications to design, operation or
maintenance procedures and by inclusion of various
safety devices. The need for such changes is specifically
brought out by techniques like fault tree and safety
analysis when applied to particular
equipmen tlsub-systems .
In this paper, the application of fault tree and safety
analysis techniques has highlighted the critical events
which could lead to the occurrence of top event. The
improvement in safety standards as a result of
eliminating common cause failures or reducing the
failure rate of an event, has also been quantitatively
assessed through case studies .
Steps to obviate failures of sub-systems or
components have already been enumerated in the
preceding paragraphs.
IMPROVEMENT IN SYSTEM SAFETY -CASE
STUDIES
5.
To assess the improvement of safety standards in
the nitration section due to inclusion of the various
safety measures recommended in the previous sections,
the following cases are considered :
Case 1 : Effect of Eliminating Common Cause Failures
I n this case study, effects of eliminating the following
common cause failures are considered :
Power supply failure (16), and
Water supply failure (18).
Results of the fault tree analysis obtained by this
modification using the computer program show that the
total number of cut-sets reduces from 360 to 225.
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